In the first text of this blog I will examine two positional trends that have appeared in modern football with roots linking them back to the early 20th century.
In the tactical evolution of football, positions vanish only to be born again in a new form. One such position is inside forward.
In the tactical evolution of football, positions vanish only to be born again in a new form. One such position is inside forward.
The era of the inside forwards began when the legendary Herbert Chapman of Arsenal developed the so called WM-system in the 1920's that spread throughout Europe during the next decades. Chapman developed WM from the earlier mainstream system 2-3-5, also known as the inverted pyramid. In WM, two players of the forward line are brought deeper and positioned on both sides of the central forward. The term inside forward, or inside left and inside right, took flight shortly afterwards.
Inside forwards were often diminutive, pacey and technical players who made runs in the channels and linked up with central forwards and wingers. The 1950's can be considered the golden decade of the inside forwards: they had a central role in nearly every prominent league in Europe. In one of the greatest teams in the football history, the Aranycsapat of Hungary, Ferenc Puskas and Sandor Kocsis prospered as inside forwards next to the deep-lying central forward Nandor Hidegkuti. Hidegkuti's role was one of the innovations of the decade; most teams, especially in the Great Britain, used a traditional central forward next to which the inside forwards were positioned. The differences between the traditional WM and the Central European WM-variation surfaced in an embarrassing way for the British when in 1953 Hungary beat England in what is probably the most famous friendly victory in the history of the game.
In the match of the century at Wembley one of the reasons for Hungary's victory was the new way to utilize the forward line. The players of England were baffled when it became clear that the unorthodox Hungarians did not play where they were supposed to play. Zonal marking system was still in the future and the British expected the Hungarians to be in the pitch where their numbers indicated. Thus the creative Hidegkuti was left completely free and Puskas and Kocsis were able to run to the empty space in front of England's defence and towards goal. This destroyed England's defence.
The result of Hungary's new tactics was eventually the transformation of the former central forward into a midfield playmaker and the redeployment of the two inside forwards as central forwards. Hungary's system bordered on the 4-2-4 where inside forwards do not feature, which is also the case with the other mainstream formation of the 1960's, the Italian catenaccio. The era of the inside forwards was over.
In the 21st century the inside forwards have, however, reappeared, even though they are not usually called such. The trend in itself is not new: positions have always disappeared and reappeared in football. Today, it is difficult to find traditional wingers, playmakers and central forwards in any top-tier club in Europe. One of the first teams that used a formation without a clear number 9 was Luciano Spalletti's AS Roma in the season 2006/2007. Due to injuries to all his other forwards, Spalletti repositioned the AS Roma legend, Francesco Totti, as the lone central forward. Totti, a trequartista to his core, interpreted the role in his own way and became the first true false nine in modern football. The formation was extremely effective: Totti linked up superbly with the four midfield runners behind him, usually the Brazilians Rodrigo Taddei and Mancini on the flanks and the Italians Daniele De Rossi and Simone Perrotta in the middle.
The emergence of the false nine proves the point that most "new" innovations in football are often far older than usually thought. Totti's new position had the same purpose as Nandor Hidegkuti's new role in the 1950's. In my opinion, Hidegkuti is the first false nine. In fact, he fulfilled the role quite literally, as his playing number 9 made everyone unfamiliar with the Hungarians' tactics to think that he was a central forward.
In Spalletti's AS Roma there were no inside forwards, but after the innovation spread, it developed a variation where two of the four midfield runners were positioned closer to goal, behind the lone forward. These two creative runners became modern inside forwards.
In modern football inside forwards work well with false nines but do not necessarily require them. In the Christmas Tree -formation 4-3-2-1 the central forward can either be a false nine or a more classical number 9. I would argue that the two players behind the forward, could and maybe should usually be labeled as inside forwards. They are often referred to as second strikers or attacking midfielders; sometimes they are even confused with inverted wingers. However, the players that can be found in the upper branch of the Christmas Tree have many similarities with the classical inside forwards. Their attributes and role in the pitch are similar: they make runs in behind the opposition's defense line and diagonal runs towards corner flag; they look for decisive, penetrating passes and have an eye for goal.
It is, of course, entirely possibly to call these players second strikers or attacking midfielders. The terms and definitions are only meant to help understand the game better. They are often open to discussion and sometimes even controversial. In my opinion, the term inside forward would be useful in the modern era. Only rarely are the players fielded in the upper branch of the Christmas Tree great playmakers in the mould of Zinedine Zidane or Jari Litmanen, nor are they usually wingers. In terms of attributes, they resemble much more often, say, Marco Reus or Andre Schürrle. For me, these kind of players are forwards rather than midfielders.
The key to the positional term that should be used is the type of player involved and the way he interprets his role. In the national team of Finland, for example, Teemu Pukki and Kasper Hämäläinen play like inside forwards when positioned in the upper branch of the Christmas Tree that seems to be the coach Mixu Paatelainen's preferred system these days. Roman Eremenko, on the other hand, plays more like an attacking midfielder when he is in the same position. Perhaps Paatelainen should contact the first Finnish professional football player Aulis Rytkönen, an inside left in the 1950's, for tactical consultation.
Analyzing terms and definitions can sometimes seem pedantic. Deeper understanding of football, however, is essential for any football culture and can play a part in achieving success as well. In England, analyzing football was long viewed as futile and even despicable, which is one of the reasons why England lagged far behind the more innovative Central European countries in the tactical evolution of football in the 20th century. In Finland the mainstream media still does not seem to be interested in the tactical side of the game or its history. It should be. Researching history can sometimes take the tactics forward - or backward, as reappearing inside forwards and false nines prove.
